Explaining the emergence of social trust: Denmark and Germany by Svendsen, Gunnar Lind Haase et al.
www.ssoar.info
Explaining the emergence of social trust: Denmark
and Germany
Svendsen, Gunnar Lind Haase; Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard; Graeff, Peter
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Svendsen, G. L. H., Svendsen, G. T., & Graeff, P. (2012). Explaining the emergence of social trust: Denmark and
Germany. Historical Social Research, 37(3), 351-367. https://doi.org/10.12759/hsr.37.2012.3.351-367
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY Lizenz (Namensnennung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY Licence
(Attribution). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-378690
Historical Social Research, Vol. 37 — 2012 — No. 3, 351-367 
Explaining the Emergence of Social Trust:  
Denmark and Germany 
Gunnar Lind Haase Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard Svendsen  
& Peter Graeff  
Abstract: »Die Entstehung vom sozialen Vertrauen erklären: Dänemark und 
Deutschland«. How does social trust emerge in a country? By comparing the 
cases of Denmark and Germany through six historical phases, we suggest that 
a plausible explanation is long run political stability. In Denmark, social trust 
was arguably allowed to accumulate slowly over time and was probably not 
destroyed up till the universal welfare state of the 20th century. In Germany, 
however, political instability since the first German state building hampered 
the emergence and maintenance of social trust, which is why social trust was 
never allowed to grow in this country. 
Keywords: social trust, political stability, welfare state, Denmark, Germany. 
 
I can therefore gladly admit that falsificationists like myself much 
prefer an attempt to solve an interesting problem by a bold conjec-
ture, even (and especially) if it soon turns out to be false, to any re-
cital of a sequence of irrelevant truisms. We prefer this because we 
believe that this is the way in which we can learn from our mis-
takes; and that in finding that our conjecture was false we shall have 
learnt much about the truth, and shall have got nearer to the truth 
(Popper 1963, 231). 
1. Introduction 
1.1. The Concept of Social Trust 
How does social trust emerge in a country? Why, for example, does Scandina-
via hold the highest social trust scores in the world? How has the observed high 
level of social trust in the Scandinavian countries been generated (Svendsen 
and Svendsen 2010)? In this article, we will try answer these questions by 
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referring to Denmark as a typical Scandinavian country and Germany as a 
contrast to it. 
The World Values Survey standard measure of social trust, which is the 
questionnaire item “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be 
trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” indicates the 
current amount of social trust in Denmark and Germany. Even if social trust 
can be considered a broader concept, an empirical research has used this opera-
tionalization extensively (Paldam 2009). The big puzzle is that although the 
two countries are geographically close and share many cultural traits (including 
closely related languages), they vary substantially in terms of social trust, see 
Table 1. 
Table 1: Population Weighted Percentage of People who State that “most 
people can be trusted” in Denmark and Germany 
 Year/Wave 
 1981-1984 1989-1993 1994-1999 2000-2004 2008 
Denmark 51 58 - 67 76 
Germany - 35 38 35 39 
Data source: calculated from the world values surveys, Waves 1-5. 
 
A comparison of the percentage of Danes who state that most people can be 
trusted with the percentage of Germans who share this opinion reveals a rela-
tively time invariant gap between the two countries. Offering an explanation 
for this variation could help fill a gap in the literature on the historical roots of 
social trust, which contains several competing theories. 
1.2. Literature Review 
Social trust is a key concept in the social sciences that is tightly associated with 
similar concepts such as social capital (Coleman 1988; Bourdieu 1986) or 
social networks (Lin 2001; Son and Lin 2008). Social trust is important be-
cause it is closely linked to societal goods such as economic growth and low 
corruption (Bjørnskov 2009). Although an unequivocal definition does not 
exist, it is generally agreed that social trust comprises fundamental principles of 
social interaction such as reciprocity, solidarity and fraternity (Svendsen and 
Svendsen 2009). At the empirical level, a distinction is often made between 
political and social trust resembling the difference between trust in institutions 
(also termed institutional trust and trust in people (Ostrom and Ahn 2009). The 
term social trust does not mean that people trust each other personally simply 
because they know each other well (which would be labelled specific or parti-
cularized trust). Instead, social trust denotes a much broader assessment of how 
trustworthy people are in general. Hence social trust reflects both a person’s 
more or less optimistic expectation of the interaction outcome with others and 
the underlying understanding of how the social fabric of society works. Particu-
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laristic trust and social trust are distinct concepts that might relate to each other 
but are based on different elements. Particularistic trust refers to assessments of 
specific persons (leading to the evaluation of the situational risk and the degree 
of one’s own vulnerability), while social trust does not refer to specific persons 
at all. This has different consequences on the behavioural level. While particu-
laristic trust reduces transaction costs in small groups or within dyadic relation-
ships, social trust supports solving problems of collective actions (Ostrom and 
Ahn 2009). 
Among the most dominant theories we find Putnam’s explanation that social 
trust is built bottom-up by ordinary citizens in voluntary civic associations 
(Putnam 1993). In recent years, however, Putnam’s approach has been criti-
cized for one-sidedness (e.g. Portes 1998; Kumlin and Rothstein 2005), or has 
simply been abandoned (e.g. Newton 2007; Bjørnskov 2009). This has given 
room for alternative explanations, such as the impact of socialization (e.g. 
Dohmen et al. 2008), culture (e.g. Uslaner 2002, 2008), religion (e.g. Delhey 
and Newton 2005; Weber 2009), network types in the form of bridging, bond-
ing or linking (Putnam 2000; Svendsen and Svendsen 2003; Svendsen 2006; 
Patulny and Svendsen 2007) and the quality of state institutions (e.g. Rothstein 
1998, 2009). Also the state’s role in promoting the public good of social trust is 
now eagerly discussed (e.g. Herreros 2004, 2009). 
Bottom-up explanations have thus given way to top-down explanations with 
the concomitant belief that state policies and institutions can change society 
radically, and within a reasonable time horizon. Here the beneficial effects of 
welfare state institutions have been stressed. For example, Rothstein and others 
have argued that in the Scandinavian countries, the invention of the universal 
welfare state was conducive to high levels of social trust (Rothstein 2003).1 As 
we see it, this argumentation does not necessarily cancel the Putnamian civic 
society argument, as formal and informal institutions may interact in an ongo-
ing feedback effect process. As Putnam (1993, 184) explains: “Most institu-
tional history moves slowly [and] history probably moves even more slowly 
when erecting norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement” (Put-
nam 1993, 184). This may indeed be the main explanation why the Scandina-
vian countries enjoy high levels of trust which, to some degree, have insulated 
them from non-cooperative behaviour and free-riding. 
Mediating between these two theoretical positions, we argue that while insti-
tutional quality and equal access to public goods matter for social trust, history 
matters as well. Hence informal institutions may gradually become codified 
into formal institutions in the course of history (cf. Putnam 1993; Fukuyama 
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ity of political institutions” rather than support voluntary civic associations (op.cit. 362). 
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1995). In the words of Weber, “the legal guarantees and their underlying nor-
mative conceptions were slowly developed, the former following the latter, on 
which they were based” (Weber 1976 [1922], 332). That is to say that in the 
course of history, informal institutions tend to be formalized into specific rules 
of the game, which serve to maintain and, perhaps, further accumulate social 
trust; or in case of institutional break-downs and political anomie to ruin a 
norm-based informal institution as social trust. In this article we therefore com-
bine Rothstein’s institutions matter idea with Putnam/Fukuyama/Weber’s his-
tory matters idea to explain why a “trust excellence” emerged in the Scandina-
vian countries but not in Germany, their neighbour to the south. 
What we propose, then, is that the contemporary social trust gap between 
Denmark and Germany can be partly explained by their diverging political 
histories or, more specifically, by the differing number and lengths of political-
ly unstable periods that have hampered the emergence and cultivation of social 
trust. In line with the long-term view of our analysis, political instability is 
associated with the continuity of a political system (Lipset 1960), including 
events of political and social unrest (Siermann 1998). Wars, revolutions and 
civil upheavals – like those we are witnessing in Muslim North African and 
Middle East countries (spring 2011) – are of particular interest, as they usually 
affect nations as a whole and therefore tend to have influence on the level of 
social trust and, ultimately, on formal institutions, including a nation’s ability 
to produce public goods. 
1.3. Methodological Implications 
We choose Germany for comparison because this nation is rich in historical 
examples of how government institutions changed the opportunity to acquire, 
maintain and destroy social trust. In fact, the case of Germany illustrates a 
historical situation in which politically unstable conditions were structurally 
reinforced over the centuries. From a methodological point of view, such case 
studies are “[…] particularly valuable when the evaluation aims to capture 
individual differences or unique variations […]” (Patton 2002, 55). In that vein, 
we apply a “contrast of contexts” (Skocpol and Somers, 1980, 178) to “[…] 
make use of comparative history to bring out the unique features of each par-
ticular case included in their discussions, and to show how these unique fea-
tures affect the working-out of putatively general social processes.” Many 
scholars like Weber, Durkheim or Bendix have made such a historical compari-
son. It is usually done by juxtaposing individual cases, and in this way the 
historical particularity of each society is sufficiently respected. As Bendix 
(1976, 247) puts it:  
By means of comparative analysis I want to preserve a sense of historical par-
ticularity as far as I can, while still comparing different countries. […] I want 
to make more transparent the divergence among structures of authority and 
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among the ways in which societies have responded to the challenges implicit 
in the civilizational accomplishments of other countries. 
The methodological idea of contrasting contexts is to adopt a historical pers-
pective on societies to point out their differences (Collier 1993; Munck 2004). 
In order to narrow the potentially huge research focus in this paper, we pri-
marily scrutinize the relationship between state and citizens rather than cultural 
differences (Baker and Faulkner 2009). Arguably, the amount of social trust is 
partly determined by contemporary and short-term factors such as catastrophes 
like the plague or natural disasters. But there are also long-term influences that 
form a stable ‘underlying rock’ of social trust in any society, including a politi-
cal stability secured by formal institutions that are firmly embedded in shared 
norms. In a historical perspective, these trends become visible even if they are 
only seldom verifiable by a quantitative statistical or macro-causal analysis 
(Skocpol and Somers 1980). 
1.4. Findings 
Our explanation for the divergence in social trust is found in a comparison of 
political stability in the two countries across six historical phases. We demon-
strate how social trust was not destroyed in Denmark but rather further culti-
vated and codified through history as a result of positive feedback effects. In 
contrast, Germany has long suffered political instability, which presumably has 
prevented a steady accumulation of social trust over time. Overall, we attempt 
to solve an interesting and complex problem by proposing a “bold conjecture” 
(Popper 1963, 231), fully aware of the overt risk of “conjectural history” this 
involves. 
2. Political Stability in Denmark and Germany 
2.1. State-Building 
Early state-building, i.e. monopolization of violence, in Scandinavia took place 
during the Viking Age from about 780 to 1080. The Danish King Godfred 
(†810), who ruled at least the southern part of present Denmark, is the earliest 
known state-builder in Denmark. State-building enabled Viking chieftains to 
build organizations that could offer solutions to collective action problems, by 
accumulating revenue from sources ranging from simple plunder to extortion of 
tribute and taxes, as well as by selling their services. In other words, they pro-
vided protection and law enforcement, engaged in public works, supported the 
growth of trade, etc., while simultaneously reaping rents for themselves. In-
creased production and trade in turn increased their tax collections (Kurrild-
Klitgaard and Svendsen 2003; Jensen 2006). When trade flourished after state-
building in the Viking Age, the evolving trust-based trade norms were increa-
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singly institutionalized in legislation and the political system, culminating in 
the modern welfare state after World War II. Hence the modern Scandinavian 
universal welfare state may simply be deeply embedded in old and politically 
stable monarchies allowing a historical accumulation of social trust. 
State-building in Germany took a completely different path. In the early 
middle-ages, several loosely connected tribes lived alongside each other on a 
large territory in the west-middle part of Europe. The history of Germany is 
related to the development of these tribes and, therefore, related to the expan-
sion of these distinct areas and groups. Rivalry among local leaders, quarrels 
between German nobles and a politically fragmented situation are recurrent 
themes in German history.  
Some historians relate the foundation of the first German state to Charle-
magne (Karl der Große, 747-814), son of the Carolingian King Pepin (Hodges 
and Whitehouse 1983). During his reign, several distinct German tribes were 
assembled such as the Saxonians and the Bavarians. When Charlemagne died, 
he left an Empire that was eventually split up by his heirs into eastern, middle 
and western kingdoms (Treaty of Verdun 843). Since all German tribes united 
during the period of Conrad I and Henry I, some historians consider the foun-
dation of the first German state to have taken place in that period (Solsten 
1996, 8). German monarchs in the Middle Ages did not focus on a single capi-
tal for spreading their power across their dominion. Instead they frequently 
visited places or cities that in turn became centres of “[…] political life and 
venues for the assemblies, legal proceedings, and ceremonial occasions through 
which royal power had its most direct and visible impact upon the populace of 
their realm” (Warner 2001, 13). Solving problems of collective action by rely-
ing on the monarch’s authority was, therefore, more difficult, the farther a 
community was located from the centres of political life. This also implies that 
it was difficult – most often impossible – to enforce codifications of “national” 
law and order in peripheral regions. 
2.2. Early Feudalism 
The first phase after the Viking Age can be termed early feudalism. It existed 
from the 12th century to about 1300 and was characterized by weak kings who 
were strongly dependent on faithful warlords (vassals). The king was forced to 
participate in regular, institutionalized meetings with his vassals and subse-
quently confirm his promises in coronation charters or Håndfæstninger (lit. 
handshake agreements) (cf. Knudsen 1995, 109). This system was not unusual 
in Europe; keep in mind, however, that feudalism had a weak impact in Den-
mark as well as in the rest of the Nordic countries. In contrast to Western and 
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Southern Europe, the Scandinavian areas, not least Sweden,2 largely remained 
consensus societies with high levels of social and economic equality. Also note 
that norms were gradually codified in formal institutions, for example legisla-
tures.  
While the situation in Scandinavia might be characterized as consensual and 
equal, the opposite was true in Germany. Feudalism in Germany became the 
predominant form of political organisation during first centuries of the Middle 
Ages. It was a way to establish a net of personal relationships from the location 
of royal presence to subordinates in the far distance and solved the problem of 
spreading the ruler’s will across less reachable areas. Feudalism implied eco-
nomic connections between lords and peasants but also obligations to military 
services, so that the collective security problem was solved to some degree 
(Janowitz 1976). Otto I’s rise to the throne in 939 was the beginning of an era 
labelled after the Middle Ages the “Holy Roman Empire of the German Na-
tion”. At the beginning of the Millennium, this Empire extended from the 
north, with a border to the Kingdom of Denmark, to the south, covering the 
northern part of Italy with a vague border below Rome. Due to tight political 
connections and interests between the state and the church, the Pope crowned 
monarchs of the Middle Ages to Emperors as successors to Charlemagne and 
the Roman Imperators. Because of this status dependence, German monarchs 
had to regularly step into Italian polity matters in order to maintain their au-
thority (Solsten 1996, 9). Going to war at the border of the Empire or staying in 
Italy at the expense of neglecting political matters in the northern parts of Ger-
many could, however, imply social upheavals. The domestically unstable situa-
tion was defused somewhat when monarchs of the Hohenstaufen dynasty as-
cended the throne of the German Empire in 1138. In those times, the Empire 
territories took an economic upswing due to technological improvements (such 
as the horse cart), leading to subsequent population growth. But the tensions 
between the Emperor and German nobles remained. 
2.3. The Assembly of the Estates Era 
The Assembly of the estates era is the period from c. 1300 to the establishment 
of absolute monarchy in 1660. It was characterized by regular assemblies of the 
estates of the realm, securing significant political power to an assembly of 
representatives from all ranks as a kind of “people’s representation” (Knudsen 
1995, 28). Also the so-called Council of Denmark (Rigsrådet) was established, 
with the participation of some of the most powerful magnates and noblemen. 
The assembly included peasants, but only in a symbolic role. In Sweden, to 
compare, the assemblies were held until 1866 (the last assembly of the estates 
                                                             
2  That is why Sweden has been termed “the strong society” based on samförstand, i.e. strong 
cooperative norms (Knudsen 1993, 57; 1995, 77ff.). 
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of the realm in the world), including representation by peasants (Knudsen 
1995, 31). Later on, political influence was gradually monopolized by the em-
pire council, and the last assembly was held in 1536 (Knudsen 1995, 109; 
Pulsiano and Wolf 1993). In contrast to the previous meetings between king 
and vassals, the new assemblies worked in accordance with “detailed, written 
rules that described how the discussions should take place, how decisions 
should be made, and how decisions should be assigned the emperor” (Knudsen 
1995, 29). Furthermore, while previously a dozen powerful vassals and the 
king had been united in a network based on strong, personal relationship – with 
the king in the role as the first among equals and the network safeguarding their 
own personal interests more than anything else – the assembly representatives 
did not know the king personally and stood before the king as “the representa-
tives of the territories” (ibid.).  
The German kings of this time were only seldom able to maintain peace be-
tween the territories in their realm (Press 1994). Local nobles and leaders be-
came responsible for keeping order within their regions (Contamine 1986, 78). 
It was accepted, however, to start a conflict with other dukes of the Empire and 
even with sovereigns outside the Empire. In the late Middle Ages, the eastern 
border of the Empire became an important place for settlement and the founda-
tions were laid for two regions which would become decisive political forces 
for Germany in the 19th century: Prussia and Brandenburg. By the end of the 
Middle Ages, Germany was run on two political levels, precursors of the politi-
cal structure of modern Germany. In diet of provinces (Landtage), princes and 
wealthy nobles met to coordinate regional matters such as setting tax rates. In 
imperial assemblies (Reichstage), the Emperor, princes, clerical leaders and 
spokespersons of imperial towns took care of federal matters. In the later Mid-
dle Ages, an extensive codification of law began even when legal enforcement 
was usually a regional matter (Holborn 1982, 28). Around 1300, almost every 
region held its own jurisdiction and laws, inspired by former tribe rules and 
regulations and – in the later Middle Ages – by Roman law. 
2.4. Late Feudalism 
With the introduction of absolute monarchy in 1660, the king formally became 
the sole ruler. In practice, however, he had to follow the so-called Lex Regia 
(King’s Law) of 1665, the only written constitutional law of an absolute mo-
narchy in Europe at that time. For this and many more reasons mentioned be-
low, the period might be termed Soft feudalism. It ended in a bloodless transi-
tion to constitutional monarchy based on the Constitution of 1849: “When the 
autocratic monarchy fell, it was without any bloodshed whatsoever, similar to 
what was the case when it was introduced [in 1660]” (Knudsen 1993, 91). 
Hence Copenhagen became the “only capital in Europe where not a single shot 
was fired, in spite of political unrest” (Ibid.). This stands in contrast to the 
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many bloody revolutions in the German-speaking states that year. During the 
period 1660-1848, a further step towards institutionalization was taken with the 
introduction of the above-mentioned famous constitution Lex Regia, a further 
development of the Håndfæstning. At the time, the state system was costly; 
however a centralized state was greatly enhanced, enjoying strong legitimacy 
in the population. It was equipped with loyal, skilful and non-corrupt state 
employees, mostly highly educated people from the urban bourgeoisie, and 
overall constituted a modern and effective state apparatus (e.g. regarding taxa-
tion and recruitment of soldiers) – at least compared to many other countries at 
the time (Knudsen 1993, 88, 84). Also at this time, the old norm, “a word is a 
word”, was inscribed in the constitution. Danish Law of 1683 states that “Eve-
rybody has a duty to fulfill what he with mouth, hand or seal has promised” 
(Fifth Book, Chapter 1,1), and that “all contracts (...) should be kept in all their 
words (...), in which they have been agreed upon” (Fifth Book, Chapter 1,2). 
Later on, the autocratic monarchy showed a remarkable ability to test and im-
plement new reforms – hence the name “the reform-friendly autocracy” (Den 
reformvenlige enevælde). This includes recruitment of Germans to the state 
bureaucracy, a poor people’s law of 1708 and, not least, a major agricultural 
reform implemented in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. Old virtues of 
equality and peaceful cooperation could also be seen in a “balanced relation-
ship of mutual dependence” between feudal landowners and peasants, in con-
trast to what was the case in countries like Prussia and Russia (Knudsen 1993, 
79). 
The situation in Germany did not turn out so peacefully in the same age, re-
sulting in some retrograde steps for the development of precursors of social 
capital. At the beginning of 1500, political and juridical structures were re-
formed and became clearer, though. Under the Habsburg dynasty, which ran 
the Empire from the mid-15th until the 19th century, several reforms were 
initiated during the Imperial Diet of Worms in 1495. The Diet of Worms also 
introduced the idea that no one should carry on a feud with somebody else in 
the Empire (Landfrieden), which points to the fact that the “Holy Roman Em-
pire of the German Nation” could now be regarded as a nation. Interpreting the 
Landfrieden as a forerunner of the modern notion of “rule of law” and, there-
fore, as a precondition for typical forms of social trust is probably a stretch. In 
fact, it was merely the first attempt to centralize the monopoly by use of force – 
an attempt that did not work out so well for about 150 years. Domestic strains 
and tensions continued. Due to the relatively large German territory, its indis-
tinct borders and the complex and still unstable power distribution, the reli-
gious Reformation, triggered by Martin Luther in 1517, aggravated the political 
situation and did not contribute to broader German unity or religious forms of 
social capital. When the Counter-Reformation started in 1545, Germany was 
split into two religious areas: Protestants lived predominantly in the North and 
in parts of Central Germany, Catholics in the western and southern parts of 
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Germany. The Peace of Augsburg in 1555 attempted to end the conflict but did 
not succeed. It also introduced the rule that a prince was allowed to decide 
which religion should reign in his territory (cuius region, eius religio). This 
political decision still affects Germany with its local Protestant and Catholic 
patches. The first reflections of social trust regarding the promotion of public 
welfare such as taking care of needy people took place in local regions. The 
variation in the quality of public goods such as infrastructure was extreme. The 
most devastating conflict of that time, the Thirty Years War, was preceded by 
renewed peasant uprisings and a long period of economic recession. The war 
was not only an economic catastrophe; it shaped Germany as a patchwork of 
small, heterogeneous states. Among the German minor states, Prussia and 
Austria under the Habsburgs emerged as superior powers over the next 100 
years. There are some precursors of social movements and voluntary work 
regarding provision of public goods after the Thirty Years War. But in accor-
dance with the zeitgeist of the post-Reformation 17th century, those forerun-
ners appeared only seldom and were isolated. Civic engagement and social 
trust were counteracted by the continuous religious quarrels and the limits of 
minor state politics. For instance, Philipp Jacob Spener, a Lutheran theologian, 
who founded the German Pietist movement, and August Hermann Francke, the 
head of the Prussian Pietist movement, managed to establish elementary 
schools for poor children and orphanages following the Dutch example. They 
were able to finance these projects through private sponsors but only in cooper-
ation with the Prussian government (Gorski 1999, 293). 
In sum, the political and social developments in Germany during this period 
were followed by more political unrest than in Denmark; particularly events 
which affected both nations simultaneously (like the revolutions in 1849/49). 
2.5. Liberal-Capitalist State 
During the 19th century, social trust was not only preserved, it simply became 
the stable and ‘underlying rock’ under a rapid accumulation of social trust in 
the form of widespread networking to the benefit of the whole kingdom. This 
happened with the introduction of a liberal-capitalist state – that is, a political 
system which firmly institutionalized basic civic rights and thus allowed for a 
flourishing civic society and widespread provision of public goods (i.e. not 
destroying or forcing, but simply facilitating civic engagement). Already dur-
ing the late 18th and 19th centuries, social trust building was promoted by a 
codification of cooperative norms, that is, positive feedback effects confirming 
and reinforcing an ancient trust culture. Among the most important are the Law 
of Abolition of the Adscript of 1788, implementation of major land reforms 
about 1800, stimulating former serfs to become free peasants, a new constitu-
tion of 1849 securing basic freedom rights for all citizens, social reforms in the 
latter part of the century, and the introduction of a parliament in 1901 (see also 
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Svendsen and Svendsen 2004). In Denmark, the emergence of civic engage-
ment in 19th century “era of associations” (foreningstiden) has three characte-
ristics. First, during the first part of the century the large majority of associa-
tions were established by peasants. Second, nearly all were financial 
associations (mostly savings banks and assurance associations), i.e. voluntary 
cooperation aimed to provide mainly private goods. Third, during the second 
part of the century the associational model was transformed into a cooperative 
association model (andelsforening) providing private as well as public goods, 
and leading to a general increase in human capital, organizational training, 
political influence, shared buildings. This process kick-started economic 
growth in agriculture and it was greatly beneficial to Danish economy as such. 
In sum, the 19th century became a glorious civic century not only in Denmark 
but in all of Scandinavia. A myriad of voluntary associations were established 
across social cleavages, i.e. by people who formerly did not cooperate, giving 
rise to concrete trust and provision of private goods – as a means simply to 
survive. However, from the middle of the century these associations gradually 
transformed into cooperative associations and, hence, public good provision. 
As such, the fully voluntary Danish cooperative movement should be seen as 
an important element in the building of a Danish welfare state after World War 
II (Svendsen and Svendsen 2004). 
Again, the situation in Germany was different. When the last Emperor of the 
Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation resigned in 1806, the Empire was 
disbanded. Germany was still a patchwork of small state-like territories with 
Prussia and Austria outdoing all others. In the 18th century, both nations had 
been involved in several military conflicts which in 1871 led to the German 
Empire which was – for the first time in history – a real unification of Germany 
with a homogenous administration (Blaschke 2005). For the development of 
social trust it is noteworthy that Prussia initiated educational and political re-
forms in the early 19th century which motivated the foundation of social 
movements and voluntary welfare associations (Gray 1986). The state provided 
support for the associations but installed supervision as well because the asso-
ciations also served as vehicles for change and influence via the afore-
mentioned top-down strategy (Schmidt 1995, 97). But the government was not 
solely a promoter for the emerging civic society in Germany since voluntary 
associations supported the bourgeois pursuit of economic and social interests 
(Berman, 1997, 408). Since Germany was still characterized by different areas, 
the German Verein for Private and Public Welfare was created to support the 
welfare activities on the local level (Frohman 2008). With Germany’s new 
identity, norms of cooperation were transferred from the local to the national 
level, but this process has been hampered by ever present regional interests 
through the centuries. It can be assumed, therefore, that due to this historical 
mark and due to a close link between state and voluntary work, incidents of 
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political instability such as wars or political situations of crisis hampered the 
formation and maintenance of social trust. 
2.6. The Welfare State 
As stated by several scholars (e.g. Knudsen 1995; Rothstein 2005), broad polit-
ical consensus about codifying social, political and civil rights for all citizens 
seems to be at the core of developing the Scandinavian universal welfare states 
after World War II. In Denmark, old norms of cooperative behaviour and mu-
tual trust were reflected in major social reforms during the 1970s, providing 
economic security for single mothers, disabled, disability pensioners, uninsured 
unemployed, etc. These laws should be seen as a further formalization and 
specification of previous codifications of civil rights in the 19th and early 20th 
centuries, such as those found in a very liberal Danish Constitution of 1849 
introducing voting rights, freedom of speech and the right to free assembly, or 
the first mandatory school system in the world in 1814. 
Unlike in Denmark, political consensus on codifying civil rights for all citi-
zens occurred in Germany for the first time explicitly after World War II. De-
spite earlier attempts, such as during the Weimar Republic in 1919, the period 
from the beginning of the German Empire in 1871 to the end of the totalitarian 
Nazi rule in 1945 was characterized by continuous changes and political insta-
bility. By the end of World War I, the German Empire dissolved, leaving space 
for democratic improvements by new political establishments. The Weimar 
Republic itself was not as stable as expected and finally led to Hitler’s dictator-
ship. The concept of social trust is hardly applicable to the Nazi period as the 
government stirred up mistrust towards certain minorities (such as homosex-
uals) and groups (like the Jews). The idea of voluntarism and social trust was 
strictly interpreted in terms of community (Gemeinschaft), self-help and in the 
light of Darwin’s ideas of the survival of the fittest. As a consequence, social 
trust was systematically destroyed and increasingly replaced by harmful bond-
ing networks. Organizations or groups that were willing to cooperate and suited 
the Nazi ideology were integrated, all others forbidden or sanctioned. All as-
pects of welfare became either a direct matter of the state or, at least, state 
controlled. When the Nazi regime ceased to exist by the end of World War II, a 
period of continuous political and economic stability began. The contemporary 
federal political system in Germany still reflects the historical fragmentation 
but – for the first time in social history – social movements and voluntary grass 
root activities led to social change bottom-up (such as the students’ movement 
or the peace movement) or to an intellectual reorientation by the 1968 left-wing 
revolution. The long lasting top-down impact of social modernization by go-
vernmental bodies was finally broken and substituted by a mutual system of 
social influence. But even when Germany was able to initiate an incredible 
catch-up process regarding positive political, economic and social conditions in 
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the last 50 years of the 20th century, the amount of social trust is still signifi-
cantly lower than in Scandinavia. 
3. Conclusion 
Our motivation for writing this paper was to explain the emergence of social 
trust. The starting point was the huge contemporary gap in trust levels between 
high-trusting Denmark and low-trusting Germany. We suggest that this is due 
to differences in political histories, where political stability has reigned in 
Denmark since the Viking Age, while Germany has suffered through centuries 
of political instability. Hence our main finding is that early state building in the 
case of Denmark during the Viking Age and the relatively politically stable 
development since then facilitated public good provision. In contrast, Germany 
failed to create a political and societal environment that allowed for the devel-
opment of social trust. Long-run political stability arguably allows a self-
reinforcing process over time, when social trust together with other informal 
institutions is codified in legislature and the institutional setup. While this 
happened in Denmark at an early stage in history, the rivalry between the em-
peror and the German nobles, a steady political and – from the end of the Mid-
dle Ages – religious fragmentation combined with a susceptibility to go to war 
(due to external or internal challenges) destroyed social trust and hampered the 
development of stable institutions that might preserve the remaining small 
amount of generalized trust. 
There are arguments against our contrast-oriented historical comparison. A 
holistic description of a country’s history necessarily re-evaluates the temporal 
sequence of events higher than the explicit development of theoretical causali-
ties as “[…] the chronological account, ‘telling the story,’ is allowed to suffice 
as the mode of conveying understanding of what happened and why” (Skocpol 
and Somers 1980, 193). However, since this paper focuses on positive social 
processes which allow the emergence and maintenance of social trust, the study 
does not fall prey to the usual criticism that dependent and independent va-
riables cannot be separated. One might further complain that Germany has 
taken a special path (Sonderweg) in history (particularly in modern times) and 
therefore is hardly comparable with other countries.3 This argument would in 
fact reinforce our contrast-shaped view as the German particularities allow for 
an extreme case comparison of conditions that influence social trust (Yin 
1989).  
Regarding the potential drawbacks of our analysis, an important policy im-
plication could be that nations and regions secure political stability in order to 
                                                             
3  The idea of a German Sonderweg has been discussed by historians for several years 
(Dahrendorf, 1968; Blackbourn and Eley, 1984). 
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achieve the extra gain of social trust. This is one more reason for political deci-
sion-makers to actively promote political stability in any society, for example 
by identifying and building upon cultural-institutional templates identified in a 
nation’s – or area’s – history like the Michaelmas Revolution in Hungary in 
1918, the civic movements in Denmark, US and many CEEC countries during 
the 19th century, the glorious revolution in England in 1688, the Axumite 
kingdom in Ethiopia from the 1st century or the North African Maghreb traders 
from the 7th century.  
Our findings indicate that it takes a long time to accumulate social trust – 
about 1000 years in the case of a Scandinavian country like Denmark. It may, 
however, take a radical government (such as the Nazi regime) a very short time 
to destroy it. 
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